Hegemonic and Subordinated Masculinities: Class, Violence and Sexual Performance Among Young Mozambican Men
Christian GROES-GREEN
University of Copenhagen, Denmark

ABSTRACT

The article explores theoretical implications of sexual and violent practices among disenfranchised young men in Southern Africa. Ethnographic findings from Maputo, Mozambique indicate that massive unemployment caused by neo-liberal reforms have led to a growing number of young men basing their authority vis-à-vis women on bodily powers, understood as abilities and physique of the male body, rather than on economic powers and social status. While young men from the city’s growing middle class enact hegemonic masculinities in relationships to female partners, by means of financial powers and adherence to a ‘breadwinner’ ideology, poor young men react to a situation of unemployment and poverty by enacting masculinities that are subordinate vis-à-vis middle class peers, but which find expression through violence or sexual performance vis-à-vis female partners.

Keywords: Mozambique, young men, sexuality, violence, masculinities.

1. INTRODUCTION

As observed in studies from sub-Saharan Africa there seems to be a rise in forms of masculinity that to different degrees are based on sexuality or violence (Silberschmidt, 2004; Silberschmidt 2001; Wood & Jewkes, 2005; Barker, 2005). However, there is a need for more discussion of the processes through which sexual and violent practices can be seen as substituting masculine powers based on wealth and status. Although there is a growing literature on men and masculinities in sub-Saharan Africa (Morrell & Ouzgane, 2005; Morrell, 2001; Lindsay & Miescher, 2003; Silberschmidt, 1999) the question of how to classify forms of male power in varying social and economic contexts remains to be answered.

Findings from 16 months fieldwork among urban middle class and impoverished young men in Maputo, Mozambique in 2007, 2008 and 2010 indicate that there is a need to examine the social background against which masculinities emerge and transform in Southern Africa.¹ In the absence of

¹ ‘Middle class’ refers in the neo-Marxian tradition to a social class which is formed ideologically in opposition to the socially marginalized working class and vice versa (Weis, 1990). In this understanding the social classes do not necessarily define themselves through
economic powers and social status amid massive unemployment and poverty, many young men in the study seemed to rely on sexual practices or violence as ways of expressing male authority vis-a-vis female partners, often in opposition to middle class peers, who gained authority through consumerism and material gifts to girlfriends.

Fieldwork consisted in a survey involving 500 young men and women, the results of which have been discussed elsewhere (Groes-Green, 2009a, 2009b), 8 focus group discussions (FDGs) with 90 informants all together, 45 of them male and 45 female, and finally 13 male and 12 female informants who participated in the FDGs were chosen for individual in-depth interviews. The informants were between 16 and 23 years old, the majority of them less than 20 years old. Of the 90 informants, 21 were middle class youth from the urban city centre and 69 were youth from working class backgrounds in impoverished suburban areas. Most middle class youth lived with their families in guarded condos in the city centre called Maputo cimento (concrete Maputo) due to its modern buildings and roads. All informants from middle class backgrounds attended secondary school, some in public and others in private schools. None of them needed to work since they received money from their parents, often between 10.000 (310$) and 26.000 meticais (815$) a month which is well above the average monthly income in Mozambique. Besides, the young men were often allowed to use their parents’ car to roam around the city or take girlfriends and lovers out for dinner or to the beach. Most of them were in the final year of secondary school preparing for university or waiting to start a training job in the business or public sector, facilitated by social contacts in the families. Their parents, most often the fathers, mostly held senior positions in the public sector or the government, or in private businesses and had household incomes between 250.000 (7800$) and 60.000 (1875$) meticais a month.

Working class youth among whom I conducted most of my studies, lived, as do the large majority of the population, on the suburban outskirts of the city characterized by poverty, unemployment, poor housing and shortage of basic necessities. Two thirds of working class youth attended a public secondary school. The last third was permanently unemployed and had ended their education before or just after completing primary school. Some of them tried to make a living or support their families by selling copies of DVD movies, phone cards or even stolen goods on the street or by taking all kinds of odd jobs, but most had to rely on the limited income of other family members or live off the crops grown on the family’s machamba (small plot of land). The poor young men’s reasons for dropping out of school or not entering secondary school were either that their parents could not afford to pay for the tuition or that they believed education would not bring them closer to finding a job. The large majority of informants from impoverished areas had been rejected as they tried
to get a training deal in a shop or a firm. Even getting a job as a guard, which is one of the most common jobs taken by poor men, was becoming difficult due to the rising competition brought about by economic reform and migration to Maputo city from rural areas in Maputo province and neighbouring provinces. Most of their parents were unemployed, but some fathers had jobs as taxi drivers or part time jobs doing manual labour and some of their mothers worked as maids for affluent families in Maputo city. Often, families were dependent on financial support from members of the extended family with a higher income or with access to land. Even with support from kin the household income of the families was often less than 200$ a month, and in many cases the young men in the study had less than 10$ a month to spend on clothes, leisure activities or gifts for girlfriends.

2. HEGEMONIC AND PROTEST MASCULINITIES: CLASS AND GENDER RELATIONS

Inspired by the philosopher Antonio Gramsci’s (1957) power analysis, Reaywn Connell (Connell, 1995; Connell & Messerschmidt 2005) has over the years elaborated a series of concepts for masculinities defined by their place in the matrices of power, inequality and gender structures. Among Connell’s key concepts, ‘hegemonic masculinities’ is the most notorious and popular in studies of men in Southern African. In many studies the concept has been used to describe various male powers over women ranging from economic, social and physical dominance to political, judicial or cultural authority (e.g. Broch-Due, 2005; Dover, 2005; Bhana, 2005; Heald, 1999; Mooney 1998). Although many studies have rightly used the concept to shed light on the prevalent gender inequalities and injustices, especially in South Africa, the findings from the present study in Maputo’s urban and suburban areas show that ‘hegemonic masculinities’ do not capture the social inequalities and complexity of male powers. In particular the findings point to the necessity of adding complementary concepts that illustrate the harsh social contrasts between middle and working class masculinities in urban Southern African settings. By reference to Antonio Gramsci’s differentiation between hegemony and dominance and Connell’s elaboration of Gramsci’s ideas in masculinity studies I argue that hegemonic masculinities are often linked to a privileged social class while subordinate masculinities often express themselves though dominance, violence or sexuality in relationships to female partners. In particular, I argue that some young working class men’s violent relationships to their female partners should be understood in the light of what Gramsci defined as dominance seen as a form of power which tends to substitute hegemony when a relationship is challenged. While hegemony is understood as a hierarchical power relation based on a large degree of complicity and stability between actors in a relationship, dominance is defined through the use of force and
coercion in situations of conflict and disagreement (Gramsci, 1957; see also Kurtz, 1996). While Gramsci applied these concepts in the analysis of class relations, Connell applied the concept of hegemonic masculinity to the study of relations between men and women as well as between classes of men. In this article I primarily use these concepts to explain power relations between young men and their female partners. Connell (1995: 109–114) refers to forms of masculinity which are opposed to and subordinated to ‘hegemonic masculinities’. For example she defines ‘protest masculinity’ as a marginalized masculinity which cannot be based on the privileges of hegemonic masculinity but needs to rework the themes of male superiority in a context of poverty. Protest masculinity, according to Connell, entails a focus on active heterosexual practices which, along with the ‘level of tension’ that follows from poverty, leads to an ambience of violence where boys put together, ‘a tense [...] facade, making a claim to power where there are no real resources for power’ (Connell 1995: 111). This makes the power that poor unemployed young men have over women fragile and unstable. Connell explains that unemployed young men, ‘[b]y virtue of class situation and practice (e.g., in school)’ [have] ‘lost most of the patriarchal dividend. For instance, they have missed out on the economic gain over women that accrues to men in employment’ [...] (Connell 1995: 116). Thus, Connell illustrates how poverty and marginalization of a social class tend to increase the use of violence and coercion. As she writes, men’s use of violence against women is a sign that hierarchy and hegemony is no longer stable and that the gender order is in a process of crisis and transformation: ‘Violence is part of a system of domination, but it is at the same time a measure of its imperfection. A thoroughly legitimate hierarchy would have less need to intimidate’ (Connell 1995: 84). However, as Connell & Messerschmidt (2005) and Hearn (2004) remind us, what has been termed a ‘crisis of masculinity’ does not exclude the possibility of a well functioning hegemony among socially and economically dominant classes of men.

The male ideal that stands out as the ‘hegemonic’ masculinity in much of sub-Saharan Africa is referred to as the ‘breadwinner’ ideal, which defines men who can provide economically for their female partners and families and who earn their male authority through this practice (Silberschmidt, 2001; Cornwall, 2003; Hunter, 2005). Although certainly, many of the young men who were part of the study were not ready to establish a family or ready to get married, they were very influenced by the breadwinner ideal. Many of the young men I interviewed subscribed to the breadwinner ideal, even when they were only 16 or 17 years old. As some of the poorest young men told me, they were constantly reminded that, ‘without money you are nobody, you are worthless in the eyes of women’. The feeling of being ‘a worthless man’, informants told me, was related to girlfriends’ or lovers’ complaints that they did not provide gifts and financial support. Others explained how, faced with the impossibility of getting a job, they felt ‘unmanly’ when they realized that their family expected them to one day become husbands and heads of households. Hence, young men’s ability to live up to the ideals of the hegemonic masculinity in Maputo
depends entirely on their place in the social structure. Due to the widening gap between classes of youth in the city and the high prices on consumer goods it is mostly middle class youngsters who are able to live up to the breadwinner ideal, by means of their access to cash which enable them to provide girlfriends with consumer goods and fashionable gifts like necklaces, mobile phones and to take them out for ‘dinner and drinks’ in the city centre. At the other end of the social ladder working class youth are, in the face of marginalization, increasingly left without jobs, cash and education.

In the absence of work, status and money many informants from poor backgrounds reasserted their masculinity through ‘bodily powers’ understood as powers based on abilities and physique of the male body. Despite the fact that violence and sexual performance are both practices anchored in the body findings showed that were highly contradictory forms of power. Juxtaposing some young men’s increasing preoccupation with sexual satisfaction of female partners with other young men’s use of violence against their partners, it seemed that sexuality and violence emerge as bifurcated reactions to the problem of an unstable male authority brought about by unemployment and poverty. Some informants’ preoccupation with satisfying their female partners and constant discussions about improving sexual performance seemed to illustrate a search for power and male authority by non-coercive means. I term this male power ‘sexualized masculinity’ because it is based on the man’s ability to perform sexually, give erotic pleasure and become respected due to his sexual satisfaction of the female partner.

3. THE POLARIZATION OF MASCULINITIES AMID NEO-LIBERAL REFORM

For decades large parts of sub-Saharan Africa have experienced socio-economic polarization and felt the dire social consequences of globalization and neo-liberal reform (Ferguson, 2006). A structural adjustment program, launched in 1987 by The World Bank and IMF, forced the Mozambican government to open up for foreign investment and businesses. During the civil war from 1977 to 1992 the ruling party FRELIMO was able to employ a part of the male population in the public sector, i.e. the military, agricultural work, educational institutions, the health sector and industries which had been nationalized in the wake of independence (Arndt et. al., 2006). This policy came to an end from the mid 1990s when national companies were privatized and the public sector was shrinking (Marshall & Keough, 2004; Pitcher 2002). Due to the international community’s interest in building a democratic society with a

---

2 FRELIMO was originally a Marxist-Leninist party which officially opposed foreign influence from market forces and intended to nationalize and collectivize all forms of production. Since the mid-eighties FRELIMO has gradually changed both politics and rhetoric (Sumich, 2008).
flexible market these initiatives were accompanied by a rise in development aid from the UN and Western donors (Fauvet, 2000). The growth of investment in the private sector paved the way for a growing middle class with access to higher education, stable jobs and good incomes (Pitcher, 2002; Sumich, 2008). At the same time luxurious restaurants, bars, nightclubs and private leisure associations popped up where these goods are on display and conspicuous consumption takes place (Hawkins et. al., 2009).

The downside to this development was economic deprivation of the majority of the Mozambican population (Marshall & Keough, 2004; Calder, 2005), mass unemployment among youth in urban centres (Garcia & Farés, 2008) and an increasing gap between on the one hand the elite and the middle class living in secure urban areas, and on the other hand the impoverished populations living below the poverty line and struggling for survival in rural and suburban areas (Baptista Lundin, 2007; Virtanen & Ehrenpreis, 2007).

During fieldwork I observed how young middle class and working class men relate differently to the socio-economic changes in Maputo. Male middle class youth with easy access to jobs or support from their families were clearly able to adapt to ideals of consumption and consequently found it easy to live up to female partners’ material expectations. By contrast, in Maputo caniço3 young men frequently expressed anxiety about the material demands which were put upon them by girlfriends and casual sexual partners. The majority acknowledge that an ideal man is one who has a job or an education and who can provide for his woman. Consequently, the lack of access to education, the high level of unemployment and the prospects of unemployment after completing secondary school caused deep frustrations in romantic relationships. The prevailing dissatisfaction among young women in my study was directly linked to their male partners and their families’ inability to support them economically. And young men often complain that their girlfriends show them no respect and that they, ‘only think about money’. The tendency towards conflicting gender relations has been observed across different parts of Africa sometimes related to generational changes and sometimes linked to male disempowerment in the household, due to unemployment and lack of incomes, which tend to fuel disagreements over and redefinitions of male roles and responsibilities (Cornwall, 2003; Silberschmidt, 1999). Faced with the financial inabilities of their families and boyfriends young working class women in Maputo increasingly engage in relationships with so-called ‘patrocinadores’ (literally meaning a donor, in other regions called sugar-daddies) (See also Hawkins et. al., 2009). Patrocinadores are usually older affluent men who poor young women rely on to fulfil their material needs and pay for their education in exchange for company and sexual favours (Luke & Kurz, 2002; Silberschmidt & Rasch, 2001). Poor young women’s contemporary relationships with

---

3 Maputo caniço (reed Maputo) refers to suburban areas were houses are made of reed and other fragile materials. In Maputo caniço fieldwork was primarily conducted in two suburban areas: Malhazine and Zona Verde.
Nordic Journal of African Studies

patrocinadores may also be understood in the light of a new ideal of female independence observed across Africa, especially in globalized settings (Cole, 2003; Haram, 2005; Silberschmidt & Rasch, 2001) where youth’s search for ‘romantic adventures’ and material wealth challenge customary adherence to arranged marriages and obligations towards the extended family (see e.g. Tersbøl, 2005; Mills & Ssewakiryanga, 2005; Spronk, 2006).

4. THE CONSTRUCTION OF MAPUTO’S HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS

Despite the fact that the concept of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ has been used in analyses of gender relations for more than a decade there are still disagreements as to its meaning and there is little consistency in the use of the concept in analyses of power and gender relations (Beasley, 2008; Whitehead, 1999; Jefferson, 2002; Hearn, 2004; Howson, 2008). In order to meet fellow scholars critiques of the concept, Connell & Messerschmidt (2005) redefined ‘hegemonic masculinity’ as a normative male ideal in a society which supports the gender hierarchy and subordinates marginal masculinities and men who do not comply with it. Hence, hegemonic masculinity is to be seen as a cultural prototype or ideal masculinity which is largely acknowledged and accepted by both women and men in a society, even if they have no chance of conforming to the ideal (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005; see also Lusher & Robins, 2009).

In most African societies, including Mozambique, the man is seen as the natural provider for the family who besides often controlling the land also decided over sexual and reproductive issues (Goody, 1976). Anthropologists remind us of the possibility that such gender roles and divisions of labour were put in place by colonial regimes (Arnfred, 2004; Amadiume, 1987). The hegemonic masculinity in Southern Mozambique which is linked to the man’s role as provider was cemented during the Portuguese colonial transformation of society through forced labour in the prazo system (Arndt et. al., 2006). According to the ideals of Christianity and official Portuguese tenets, it was men’s responsibility to provide for the family for which reason they could legitimately be induced or forced to work in the fields in return for a low salary (Arnfred, 2004). Mozambique was conquered by the Portuguese in the 16th century and slavery was introduced in the 18th Century. When slavery was officially abolished in 1850 many men kept working for low wages on plantations or in the mines in South Africa (Arndt et. al., 2006). During colonial rule it gradually became a male responsibility to do income generating work outside the household such as contract labour in semi-industrial production and odd jobs in the informal market (ibid.). The hegemonic masculinity among

4 It has been suggested that we shift attention from looking at hegemony in gender research as an ideology or a structure to critically engaging in studies of the hegemony of actual men in powerful social positions (Hearn, 2004; Beasley, 2008).
youth in Maputo today is constituted by a combination of this historically inherited provider ideal and the more modern ideal of a male consumer with access to material symbols and commodities. If a young man in Maputo wants to become a man of status among his male and female peers he must live up to these ideals. Young men who live up to this hegemonic masculinity are sometimes called ‘showoffistas’, which stems from the English ‘to show off’, and refers to persons who publicly exhibit their fashionable clothes, cars and beautiful girlfriends. Young men and women of both middle and working class background agreed that being well dressed and providing women with material benefits was essential to be an attractive man. As a young woman said: 'It has to be a good looking man, so I look at the shoes, the trousers, the shirt. And hey, the guy better be ‘showoffista’. He will have to carry me around in his car.' (Woman, 23, unemployed, Maputo)

Among youngsters with no access to cash, fashionable cars and clothes the ideal of the ‘showoffista’ is impossible to live up to. In the context of consumerism a sexual economy is established where having many sexual partners is the exclusive privilege of upper and middle class ‘patrocinadores’ and ‘showoffistas’. As observed in similar situations elsewhere in Africa young working class women’s engagement with wealthy boyfriends make them gradually independent of male partners of the same age and class (Cole, 2003). Some young working class men told me that they occasionally try to put up with their knowledge that the girlfriend has a rich man as lover because they know they may benefit from the money and commodities that girlfriends accumulate through these transactional sexual relations. The consequence of not having an income is not only that these youngsters see their girlfriends run off with wealthier men. In the long run poverty also makes it impossible for them to pay the lobolo (bride price) in the event of marriage, whereas middle class youngsters can easily afford to marry and at the same time be able to support several casual sexual partners. Against this background it is maybe less of a surprise that young men from poor backgrounds apply different strategies in the struggle to keep a girlfriend by other means than the strictly economic.

5. VIOLENCE AND THE MOLUMWE: THE MOVEMENT FROM HEGEMONIC TO VIOLENT MASCULINITIES

During FGDs one third of the male informants admitted that they had been acting violently against their girlfriends or female lovers. By far most of them came from the impoverished suburban areas, and only one of them had a middle class background. When asked why they used violence against girlfriends in sexual relationships many informants explained that they were acting like their fathers, uncles and ancestors have always done, ‘when women are unruly’. Some asserted that, ‘put women in their right place’ is a tradition, ‘which shows the spirit of an African warrior’ who were often described as ancestors from an
unspecified pre-colonial past. Furthermore, when trying to explain or justify violence poor youngsters repeatedly invoked the expression ‘moluwene’, which is borrowed from the language Changana, spoken by the majority of the population in the suburban areas of Maputo (Lopes, 1998). In Changana moluwene has a range of meanings, including being wild, aggressive, a warrior and ‘a tough man’. The moluwene prototype is seen as an original African man who is dominant in relations to women and ‘a warrior in life’. As one informant explained it:

On the other hand there are women who do not like a man totally serious and only thinking about his job. So I try to show my moluwene side. The girls also like that, sometimes I hear comments. They say, ‘I like my boyfriend, he is like, a moluwene’. So I try to show that, my wild, aggressive side. I also speak Changana because in the old days [referring to colonial times] that was wrong. But today it is something beautiful. Girls appreciate both the positive and the negative aspects, we cannot live out our positive sides alone. Being a moluwene you are abiding by the rules of our forefathers, you’re fighting. You can take the woman and show her who is in charge (Man, 20, unemployed)

Being moluwene is often described in opposition to the rich and middle class men who are condemned and ridiculed as physically weak, boring, morally correct and too well mannered (Groes-Green, 2009a). Male informants often mentioned how they felt provoked when a girlfriend complain about their inability to help financially by paying the rent or tuition fees at school and their refusal to take them out for dinner or give them luxurious gifts. The economic aspect of violence against women was all too evident in most cases that I know of, but it also had to do with a general male conviction that they somehow own their girlfriends and that any kind of infidelity was an insult to their manhood. Informants mentioned that they saw infidelity and complaints as the most legitimate reasons to punish the girlfriend with different degrees of violence to ‘make her respect you’ and ‘not be an interesseira’. To ascribe violence against women to male disempowerment certainly does not do justice to complex causes of physical coercion. Nevertheless, there seems to be a clear link between violence against women, social marginalization of men and historical suppression, which has been observed in many cultural contexts (Barker, 2005; Bourgois, 1995; Silberschmidt, 1999; Morrell, 2003). Morrell explains how power aspects of British colonialism and the suppressive structures of Apartheid informed a particularly violent form of masculinity in the South African context.

---

5 Linguists also refer to Changana as Changaan or Xichangana.
6 The high number of young working class men who confessed to me that they were violent towards their partners reflects official reports that use of violence and sexual violence against young women in Maputo is on the rise (Arthur & Mejia, 2006).
7 In Maputo an ‘interesseira’ designates a woman who is ‘interested in the money’ or who is seen as ‘a prostitute’.
As an affirmation of masculine power, South African men’s violence against women takes place in the inter-personal realm of relationships characterized by social despair, misogyny and ideas of male entitlement to women’s bodies (Morrell, 1998, 2003).

6. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY THESIS

Inspired by Connell’s classification of masculinities researchers on youth masculinities in Southern Africa have suggested that male violence and sexual behaviour are integrated elements in a patriarchal society that ensure the rule of hegemonic masculinities (Besides Bhana, 2005, also Wood & Jewkes, 2005; Wood, Lambert & Jewkes, 2007; Jewkes & Morrell, 2010). For example in her study of masculinities among black South African school boys Bhana argues that the violence which boys use against each other in a poverty ridden environment serves to consolidate a masculine hegemony (Bhana, 2005: 218). Others such as Wood & Jewkes (2005: 96) tend to suggest that young men’s use of violence against girlfriends is bound up with their obsession with sexual conquests of women. My findings run counter to these suggestions in the sense that informants often regarded violence and sexuality as each other's opposites and during fieldwork I observed no direct connection between some informants' obsession with sexual conquests and others' tendencies to be violent. Trying to conceptualize the difference, I propose, with reference to Gramsci (1957) and Connell (1995) that hegemony and violence, as forms of power, are better perceived of as separate alternatives than as practices which are entangled and mutually reinforcing. As Gramsci (1957) noted, hegemony is based on stability, complicity and some degree of consent between the stronger and the weaker part in a specific power structure while force, coercion or violence is used when ‘naturalized’ power is undermined (Gramsci, 1957). In Gramsci, Kurtz (1996) insists, hegemony and domination are defined as two different but complementary forms of power:

In one, domination, it uses coercion and force against those who resist its authority and power. In the other, hegemony, it uses intellectual devices to infuse its ideas of morality to gain the support of those who resist or may be neutral, to retain the support of those who consent to its rule (…) (Kurtz, 1996: 106).^8

In the same vein Connell & Messerschmidt (2005) points to the fact that a thoroughly legitimate gender hierarchy has less need to use violence,

---

^8 This difference consists not only in the fact that dominance is based on sheer force, but is also illustrated by historical moments where dominance enters as a political necessity because hegemony and established hierarchies are challenged to the extent that people mobilize against it (Kurtz, 1996).
Hegemony did not mean violence, although it could be supported by force; it meant ascendancy achieved through culture, institutions, and persuasion (Connell & Messerschmidt 2005: 832).

Returning to Gramsci’s concepts of dominance and hegemony from his political analysis of the state and civil society to the field of gender relations we may conclude on a similar note. Following Gramsci’s outline of the concept of dominance it becomes apparent that naked force and violence is an option to which poor young men in Maputo resort when their hegemony, i.e. their ‘taken for granted’ authority based on stable jobs and financial abilities, is contested. When the gender hierarchy is broadly accepted by the partner and the woman is still satisfied with the way in which the male partner performs as a provider it implies that hegemony is still in place. However, his hegemonic position is undermined in circumstances where the material bases of the provider role are taken away as is the case among young unemployed men in Maputo.

7. SEXUAL PERFORMANCE, PHYSICAL APPEARANCE AND ‘SEXUALIZED MASCULINITIES’

According to a range of scholars the role of sexuality, especially among youth, has changed in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa (Silberschmidt, 2005; Aboim, 2009; Spronk, 2006; Heald, 1999). Traditional emphasis on reproductive purposes and cosmological meanings of sex has gradually been substituted by or accompanied by an equally significant desire for sexual satisfaction (Cornwall, 2003), recognition (Spronk, 2006) improved self-esteem, (Silberschmidt, 2001) or economic needs and interests (Hawkins et. al., 2009).

A central finding from my study was that young working class men are increasingly preoccupied with their sexual performance, bodily strength and physical appearance. Undoubtedly, emerging sexualized masculinities are linked to the influx of images of sexy and trained bodies from foreign movies, magazines and MTV. However, the tendency should also undoubtedly be seen in the light of young men’s ever decreasing ability to regain control in the social and economic arena of gender relations. Working class youngsters cultivated their physique and male identity, not only through the practice of bodybuilding and sports, but also through the development of skills in the intimate sphere of sex and seduction. This is much in line with findings among poor young men in other parts of Africa where investment in sexuality is explained as an effect of poverty and lack of job opportunities (Aboim, 2009; Wood & Jewkes, 2005; Silberschmidt, 2005; Tersbøl, 2005; Cornwall, 2003). It became clear that to the majority of young men in the study being a skilled lover was seen as the most effective way to hold on to a girlfriend when a job, education or other kinds of socio-economic status was out of reach. The youngsters explained how improving their sexual skills would guarantee that women would eventually see
them as ‘a real man’ (*um homem de verdade*). In many instances this implies the
ability to sexually satisfy the female partner as well as to demonstrate erotic
skills and charm in the intimate sphere. These qualities include being strong,
decisive and enduring as well as knowing how to stimulate the erotic zones of
the female body and bring a woman to orgasm. As one of my informants said:

You, when you have sex, you can’t shoot [ejaculate/come] early, you
have to show to her that you are a very potent guy. Women like guys like
that, sometimes she shoots before you. She is tired, and she says, ‘this
uncle gave me a lot of work today’ (Man, 21, unemployed, out of
school).

As a young woman assured me, a man’s ability to satisfy her sexually was
sometimes just as important as his abilities to support her economically. This
notion was frequently confirmed by other young women:

For me to like him more and not to be discouraged, not leave him, and
stay with him a long time, he has to know how to touch me, satisfy me.
He should not be, like, in and out and game over, right. *If he doesn’t
please me and send me to the skies, it is unlikely that there will be a
second time* (Woman, 22, unemployed)

In the attempt to boost their sexual performance and skills men tend to exchange
experiences with each other about sexual positions, tricks and the use of
aphrodisiacs. Among the food and drinks men consume in order to improve their
sexual potency and endurance they mention black beer, milk, eggs, peanuts and
lemon. Talking about his sex life a young man mentioned the tricks he uses to
satisfy his partner:

Well, I use certain tricks in bed that I have learned from movies. Besides
that I prepare a mixture of eggs and yogurt that gives me the strength.
Another fundamental thing is to do some kind of sport, and especially
before the action you must be well prepared. Being in good shape is
important. There are women who demand that you take a long time
before you come, and if you come quickly they will call you weak. (Man,
24, unemployed, Maputo)

Another indicator of the increasing male preoccupation with sexuality is that
men in large numbers begin to consult curandeiros (local healers) in order to
increase sexual endurance, hardness of erection and sometimes in order to
achieve penile enlargement. The curandeiros I interviewed in Maputo spoke
about a large demand for help with potency problems and sexual performance
among young men. As scholars have argued there is a close link between
masculinity, violence and manifestations of sexual powers (Silberschmidt, 2001;
Connell, 1995; Cornwall & Lindisfarne, 1994). Though, what these findings
indicate is that there is a qualitative difference in the use of violence and the
performance of sexuality as ways of asserting a sense of manhood and power.
8. **DEVELOPING SEXUAL CAPITAL IN THE ABSENCE OF ECONOMIC CAPITAL**

I propose that we see men’s sexual performance as having the purpose of retaining a male authority through the sexual satisfaction of the female partner while at the same time paradoxically preserving a physical sense of controlling the woman. In this light, the abilities of young men in the sexual domain can also be conceptualized as a form of sexual capital which give young men a sense of respect in the eyes of female partners and which can be seen as poor young men’s answer to a situation where economic capital is out of their reach.

The sexual satisfaction, serves the purpose of holding on to a partner by means of giving her pleasurable erotic experiences and fulfilling her needs. Hence, sexual performance is not merely a strategy to secure one’s status among other men but rather a gateway to staying in power in a relationship and keeping a desired female partner. We may understand the development of sexual capital against the backdrop of Mauss’ (1934) concept of ‘techniques of the body’ which he understood as a person’s use of corporeal performances and skills in order to support his or her authority. Following Mauss (2000) we may see these ‘techniques of the body’ used in the sexual arena as part of a logic of reciprocity. When the young man cannot provide the female partner with material gifts and money he can at least provide erotic experiences, a well trained body and sexual satisfaction. As Mauss (1934: 211–214) noted, a continuous flow of gifts and prestations, be they material or immaterial, emotional or corporeal, may help build authority and respect as well as mutual dependency while an interruption of reciprocal exchanges could provoke social conflicts.

Furthermore sexual performance can be seen as serving the purpose of preserving an imagined control over women, expressed by informants through metaphors of ‘punishment’ or ‘suffering’. This is in line with Bourdieu’s (2001) observation that sexual intercourse in many cultures is represented as an act of domination and as a symbol of male possession of a woman. Although control is not effectively achieved by means of sexuality men’s desire for control over a woman is expressed through sexual practice (Bourdieu, 2001). This resonates with my findings where the desire for control over women was repeatedly expressed by my male informants in relation to their sexual performance:

I don’t know what I’m doing these days. I have quit school because there is no way I can pay for it. I just roam around, trying to grab the girls. I want to be known as ‘a good lover’ [Mozambican Portuguese slang: Um bom pico]. Like, you know, the guy who really makes them suffer, makes them cry, and stop them from complaining all the time (Man, 18, unemployed, out of school)

This desire for control, however, does not translate into real coercion or physical force but rather stays an imaginary dominance expressed as sexual fantasy. Though words like ‘suffer’ and ‘cry’ are associated with violence these sexual
practices clearly do not constitute pillars in a relationship of dominance. In
discussions with male informants they explained that ‘suffering’ and ‘crying’
were to be seen as metaphors for a woman’s reaction when she reaches climax
and thus seen as a sign that the man ‘did a good job’. As the quote shows the
sexual performance is framed by the young man’s desire for a reputation as ‘a
good fuck’ and not as ‘an oppressor’. In fact, the young women told me that a
partner's ability to perform in bed and be a caring lover was a prerequisite for a
satisfactory relationship.

9. CONCLUSION: MASCULINITIES WITHOUT HEGEMONY

Understanding the complexity of a Mozambican setting that is subject to major
cultural and economic reconfigurations these years requires a thorough
rethinking of the classification of masculinities and the different positions
available in a changing gender matrix. In this article I have explored the
background against which new forms of masculinity centred on sexuality and
violence emerge among working class youth in Maputo. Feeling the
consequences of neoliberal reform after years of privatization and rising
unemployment rates young men of the poorer segments of society are unable to
live up to female partners’ expectations of them as providers of gifts,
commodities and financial support. As middle class youngsters, epitomized in
the ‘showoffista’ and older middle class ‘patrocinadores’, expand their sexual
networks through transactional relationships with less fortunate women, their
working class peers find it increasingly difficult to find or hold on to a
girlfriend. This situation of economic hardship and general social despair pave
the way for a rise in violent and aggressive masculinities as exemplified in the
prototype of the ‘moluwene’ cast as a heroic warrior and ‘tough man’ living
according to ‘original African’ traditions. While this new situation may pose a
challenge to generations of youth who have practiced a hegemonic masculinity
based on the provider ideal there is little to suggest that women are thereby
granted a more influential or less fragile position in Mozambican society.

At a time when the breadwinner ideal is increasingly difficult to fulfil young
working class men in Maputo develop a masculinity that takes the body and its
physical powers as its sources. In this article I have focused on two strategies
anchored in bodily powers. One strategy which was observed among some
informants from impoverished backgrounds was that of improving their sexual
performance in relationships with women. Training their sexual stamina and
using aphrodisiacs were means of developing what I termed sexual capital,
which would earn them the respect vis-à-vis girlfriends that they could not gain
in financial terms.

The other was the practice of violence against female partners, justified as a
return to an original and tough African masculinity. Masculinities enacted
through sexuality or violence cannot easily be subsumed to the category of
‘hegemonic masculinity’. Instead findings indicate the need to distinguish between hegemonic and subordinate masculinities, such as protest masculinities and sexualized masculinities. The tendency in studies of African masculinities to term all male powers ‘hegemonic’ risk missing not only the complexity of gender hierarchies, it also blurs the immanent significance of class and social inequality to male agency.

Impoverished youngsters’ violence against female partners is not to be seen as automatic reactions to poverty, unemployment and social marginalization. First of all, patterns of male violence against women have been observed in most culture and societies. What makes young men’s use of violence against female partners in Maputo worrisome is that it seems to present itself as an alternative to and a substitute for economic powers. Since economic powers become limited at a time when formal jobs are disappearing and education is reserved for the privileged few the turn towards violent masculinities obviously has to do with larger social and economic changes. Since these changes are brought about by the Mozambican government and the international community’s promotion of neo-liberal politics the question is how to counter social inequality and unemployment in efforts to diminish destructive aspects of subordinate masculinities in Southern Africa.

REFERENCES

Aboim, Sofia. 2009.  


Arthur, Maria J. & Mejia, Maria. 2006.  
Coragem e impunidade. Denúncia e tratamento da violência domestico contra as mulheres em Mozambique. Maputo: WLSA.

Baptista Lundin, Iraê. 2007.  


Broch-Due, Vigdis. 2005. 

Calder, Jason S. 2005. 
*Pro-Poor Growth in Mozambique: An Exploration of its Income and Non-Income Dimensions*. Andrew Young School of Policy Studies. MA Thesis, Georgia State University.


Cornwall, Andrea A. 2003. 

Cornwall, Andrea & Lindisfarne, Nancy. 1994. 


Nordic Journal of African Studies


About the author: Christian Groes-Green is a PhD fellow at the Department of Gender Research, Institute of Public Health, University of Copenhagen. He will defend his PhD thesis in one month and is the editor of two forthcoming books about gender and sexuality in sub-Saharan Africa. He has published in international journals and edited volumes. Research areas of interest include gender, social class, sexuality, inequalities and the consequences of neoliberal reform in Africa.