Wartime Propaganda, Devious Officialdom, and the Challenge of Nationalism during the Second World War in Nigeria

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ABSTRACT

War propaganda during the Second World War in colonial Nigeria, preceded by local protestations of loyalty and support of Britain, was inappropriately focused, discredited as lies, and unable either to stem the movement towards self-government or to sustain Nigerians’ acceptance of the colonial state as a viable framework for the achievement of an enduring welfare and political freedom. Relying on archival sources previously ignored by scholars, the paper challenges the conventional wisdom that war propaganda in Africa profoundly affected the elite, who appropriated British propaganda as a weapon to undermine the colonial state. It argues that the effect of war propaganda was practically nil, in eroding confidence in local role models, newspapers and other sources of propaganda which reflected local realities and concerns. In short, at the end of the war, the colonial regime abandoned this failed propaganda strategy in search of a robust no-bones-about-it abrasive propaganda approach.

Keywords: Nigeria, Propaganda, Policy, Anti-colonial, Press.

1. INTRODUCTION

Wartime propaganda during the Second World War in Nigeria has not been studied. This is in spite of the fact that it was a unique and significant episode in which Imperial Britain condescended, even if uncomfortably reluctantly, to justify her rule to, and seek the cooperation of the colonized as she battled desperately to ward off the embarrassing spectre of her own colonization by Nazi Germany. Extant studies merely emphasize the general impact of the war in awakening African political consciousness (Crowder 1974a: 597), due to the effect of Allied propaganda on freedom, which heightened the tempo of political activities all over the continent, including Nigeria (Olusanya 1980: 524).

This approach thus exaggerates the success of British wartime propaganda. It conveys the erroneous impression that colonial Nigerians until the outbreak of war never harboured any idea of nor yearned for political freedom but were jolted to the new awakening by the effects of wartime propaganda. In thus glossing over African initiative in mobilizing support for and deploying African loyalty to Britain both before and on the outbreak of war, this approach limits its interpretive framework, and the reach of its argument. In rallying African support for Britain the emergent Nigerian elite on the eve of war enunciated a
quid pro quo paradigm shift in the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized in opposition to the subsisting colonial pact paradigm. Inherent in this new paradigm shift was a clear parting of ways, if African loyalties and support were not reciprocated with the loosening of the imperial grip on the subject territory. Thus whereas the colonial state was reluctant to embark on propaganda war, to mobilize the support of colonial Nigerians, the educated elite in Nigeria seized the initiative, and succeeded not only in preparing the subject people for war but also in accepting the need for sacrifices called forth by war.

Scholarly enquiries into the subject proceed from the premise that war propaganda was initiated and executed from the metropolitan capital immediately on the outbreak of war, even if reluctantly, with Africans merely reacting to the external stimuli (Smyth 1985: 65–82). Such studies are also panoramic surveys which adopt a continental, or sub-regional, West African and East and Central African perspectives, respectively, with emphasis derived from reliance on metropolitan sources placed on official initiatives and calculations. Such works are thus fundamentally vitiated by Eurocentric perspectives (Crowder 1987: 435–38).

The greater insights into the sources, objectives and impact of war propaganda on individual territories provided by the works of Smyth on Northern Rhodesia (1984: 345–58), Holbrook (1985: 347–61) on the Gold Coast and Gadsden (1986: 36–48) on Kenya, incisive as they are, suffer similar handicaps. This is clearly brought out by the most recent study of the subject (Ibhawoh 2007: 221–43) which subsumes Nigeria in a doubtful investigation of propaganda in British West Africa, with consequent questionable generalizations, which are discussed in subsequent paragraphs. This latter study bears out the suspicion of panoramic surveys, which ‘tend to present a smooth synthetic canvas… usually achieved at the expense of a more complex picture or reality’ (Mordi & Opone 2009: 48–56) than can be glimpsed from in-depth micro-studies.

This paper provides an in-depth, and valuable overview of some very pertinent aspects of wartime propaganda during the Second World War in Nigeria, a neglected theme in contemporary Nigerian history. But for its rudimentary treatment by Mordi (1994: chap IV), the impression that it was a post-war phenomenon (Okonkwor 1976) or unworthy of detailed scholarly attention (Hydle 1972) on its own terms might have remained fashionable for long. The current effort seeks to expand the literature on the subject by emphasizing the Nigerian background to wartime propaganda, which predated the outbreak of war when Britain was reluctant about war propaganda. It thus draws attention to the dismal failure of wartime propaganda to shape African perception of Empire and support of war effort, and questions the claim that the African elite merely ‘appropriated the discourse on freedom and self-determination deployed within war propaganda to promote their own nationalist agenda (Ibhawoh 2007: 243). This paper thus seeks to show that, the deviousness of the colonial state during the war in its relations with the colonized discredited propaganda as lies, and created a vacuum, which the
emergent elite filled by stamping their own political agenda on the popular imagination and consciousness through the medium of the nationalist press. In effect Africans rationally were selective of what they believed, and paid most attention to Nigerian publications, shows, leaders, and role models whose views reflected their aspirations and reality.

2. **NIGERIAN PROPAGANDA INITIATIVES AND POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS IN THE LEAD UP TO WAR**

The international political climate and developments between 1938 and August 1939 pointed to war. Germany not only repudiated the Treaty of Versailles, which marked the end of the First World War, she also laid claims to portions of neighbouring states, thereby triggering frantic war preparations in many European states.

The Nigerian press kept the anxious Nigerian public abreast with the events that led to war, including Germany’s sabre-rattling and the concomitant war clouds, which gathered over Europe, and indeed the entire world. Nigerians thereby appreciated the implications of the crisis for the interdependent world. Thus the *Daily Service*, organ of the nationalist Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) emphasized the need for diplomacy to avert war because ‘any European war will bring about such universal disaster’ (*Daily Service* 30 August 1938, editorial), On the other hand the *West African Pilot* (14 January 1938: ed.), which revolutionized Nigerian journalism by focussing its searchlight on racial discrimination, colonial exploitation and marginalization of Nigerians, and providing a medium for groups such as young people, artisans, clerks and village teachers previously ignored by earlier newspapers to be heard and seen in print (Jones-Quartey 1965: 154) sought assurances from the colonial authorities that Nigeria would be energetically defended in the event of actual hostilities. Due to its journalism of mass appeal, the *Pilot* was more popular and influential of the two newspapers. By giving publicity to all classes of Nigerians irrespective of ethnic or social backgrounds, it had aroused a mass audience like never before in the history of Nigeria (Coleman 1958: 224, Coker 1965: 40).

To whip up support for Britain, the Nigerian press exposed the full details of the European crisis to Nigerians, and presented Germany as the belligerent power. For the latter reason, it assured that, as in the 1914–1918 war, Nigerians would ‘stand to a man solidly behind the British Government’ if diplomacy failed to avert war. The NYM (Davies 1938: 5), convinced that no sacrifice was too great to express loyalty to Britain and the crown that ‘welds a great Empire into a homogenous whole’ offered the unqualified support of all segments of Nigeria to the Imperial power. Although the pro-colonial-government *Nigerian Daily Times* (24 September 1938) published a four page supplement and urged a practical proof of Nigerians’ loyalty to Britain, the Munich Agreement, which
signalled the triumph of appeasement over the principle of respect for the territorial integrity of small states denied them any such opportunity.

This policy of appeasement reminded Africans of the stratagem by which the major powers ‘winked their eyes and decided to see nothing, hear nothing and say nothing’ so as to ‘safeguard the peace of Europe’ when Ethiopia was invaded by Italy in 1935–36 (Pilot 20 September 1938: editorial, 12 July 1939: editorial). The British connivance had undermined African confidence in the British sense of fair play and justice. Thus politically conscious Africans identified the British government and not its officials, the ‘man on the spot, as the real enemy to be directly assaulted’ (Asante 1974: 291–302). Yet, democratic Britain appeared to be a lesser evil than Nazi Germany and was assured of Nigerian loyalty though on a quid pro quo basis due to the ‘ideals of democracy which is the bedrock of the British constitution’ that guaranteed ‘fair play to all, irrespective of race, colour or creed’. Implicit in this paradigm shift in the relations between the colonizer and the colonized was that African loyalty would be sustained only if ‘confidence begets confidence’ in terms of social equality, greater administrative responsibility, and an end to economic exploitation (Pilot 26 September 1938: editorial) of the subject peoples by the colonizer. This shift was significant as it challenged the situation which existed during the inter-war years 1919–1939, two decades that constituted the heyday of colonial rule. During the period, ‘Imperial law and order seemed to reign supreme’, as colonial officials looked ‘forward to many generations’ of colonial rule and exploitation, ‘unfettered by any African initiatives or by international opinion, both of which were to become so important after the Second World War’ (Crowder 1974b: 514, 529–34).

In these demands, the press kept alive its tradition of protest against colonial subjugation, discrimination and marginalization which dates back to the very beginning of the Nigerian press in the nineteenth century (McGarry 1978, Omu 1974, Echeruo 1977, Ainslie 1966). However, in 1938, a new element propelled and sustained the renewed protests and demands, namely the supine helplessness displayed by France and Britain in the face of German aggressions and lawlessness that sounded the death knell of the principle of collective security, and the speed with which a stupefied World accepted the fait accompli awakened Nigerians to the grim possibility of Nigeria’s annexation by Nazi Germany. For if the two major colonial powers, France and Britain, could not stop Germany, defenceless Nigerians braced up to the possibility of Nigeria being used by desperate Britain to appease Nazi Germany.

Such a possibility was heightened by reports in foreign news media, notably the Dublin-based News Review, given credibility by Nigerian students abroad. Mr. Neville Chamberlain’s prevarication on the issue in the British House of Commons only helped to further heighten anxieties. Thus the press in Nigeria anticipated the Atlantic Charter by insisting that:

Men have the right to say under what form of Government they wish to live, and where nationality is concerned they have the right to determine their own allegiance… It is an elaboration of the principle of self-
determination for minorities who find themselves unable to enjoy political autonomy. Even though this principle is generally applied to Europeans, we see no reason why it should not be applied to Africans… This is the voice of the Renascent African challenging international morality (Pilot 17 November 1938: editorial).

It is instructive that a similar rumour of Nigeria’s impending transfer to the United States of America did not ruffle feathers in 1942 (NAI Oyo Prof 2/3 C227 Vol. V April 1942).

Expositions in the Nigerian press of the ruthlessness, treachery, and violence by which the system of collective security was disintegrated, and small nations dispossessed of their sovereignty by the totalitarian states (Commager 1945: 20–25) disposed Nigerians to support Imperial Britain as she prepared for war with Germany. In the circumstance, Nigerians viewed their colonial overlords as better than Germany, whose ideology of Nazism and doctrine of the inferiority of the African as a member of the human race was reprehensible. The spectre of ‘racial extinction’ or enslavement of the African as propounded by Nazi propagandists, who reportedly equated Africans to apes and monkeys, was viewed with alarm and indignation by Africans (Pilot 19 November 1938: editorial). It was held that such a fate would befall the African if the British democratic tradition were to give way to Germany’s “Terror Government” in which ‘the subjects are oppressed and exploited, and kept in obedience by means of military force’. It was a real possibility given that the government in question was subject neither to heavenly nor earthly power, naked, unbridled, and ‘relentless as a forest fire which destroys everything and everyone’ as it sweeps along (Pilot 12, 13, 15, 16, 25 January 1940: Inside stuff, editorial).

It was against this background that the Nigerian press gave adequate coverage to the events that preceded the outbreak of war, including the British ultimatum and arrival of the “Zero Hour”. It also urged the populace to support the colonial government during the war (Pilot 26, 29, 30 August 1939: editorials, Daily Times 26 August 1939: editorial) Nigerian reaction to the outbreak of war on 3 September 1939 was thus characterized by competition among the traditional rulers, the emergent political class, and their press for a first place in proclaiming unalloyed loyalty to the British Empire. The most impressive display of this phenomenon was demonstrated in Lagos, seat of the colonial administration, where over 10,000 people of diverse backgrounds rallied their support behind Imperial Britain (Mordi 1994: 140–46). In their show of loyalty and support to Britain Nigerians were guided by the principle that ‘greater issues’ were at stake ‘which will determine the destiny of any people… connected with the powers at war’. Such issues required that British colonial subjects be ‘made to feel like one with Britain, like one homogeneous entity’. In other words, Nigerians fully understood the great issues at stake, and adopted the position ‘that it is… only a united and happy Empire and her allies with the full sympathy of America’ that could surmount the German menace (Pilot 3 January 1940: editorial).
Self sacrifice and self-effacement characterized Nigerian commitment to the achievement of this objective. For instance, the *West African Pilot* for over one year before the outbreak of war devoted its most popular “Inside stuff” column, personally written by Nnamdi Azikiwe Nigeria’s foremost nationalist politician and journalist during the World War II era (Coleman 1958, Jones-Quartey 1964, 1965, Azikiwe 1994, Olisa & Ikejiani-Clark 1989) to a dissemination of anti-German views and opinions. Azikiwe had published the newspaper in 1937 to bolster the African’s self-confidence by positioning the latter psychologically to conquer his fear of the “Whiteman” (Europeans), and its attendant inferiority complex (Pilot 8 February 1938: Inside stuff).

In its whole sale support and mobilization of local loyalty for Britain, the *Pilot* eroded its support base. In fact the newspaper for six months from the outbreak of war replaced its pro African views and editorial policy with garnering support for Britain as demonstrated by its publication of “London News” or “Imperial News” in its popular Inside Stuff column. It thereby failed to ventilate African grievances with a consequent loss of confidence: As one of its readers complained:

> It seems that the *West African Pilot* had been “dry” now for sometime, for five months or so, preceding February…. I notice that some of your popular columns were dropped in favour of “European News” which are so “dry” and lacking in local interest that some of us have begun to wonder whether we should not transfer our allegiance… since it seems we are no longer to be “Zikified” by the *Pilot* (Pilot 4 March 1940: Inside stuff).

To be sure the *Pilot* (26, 27 February 1940: editorial) which admitted that it amounted to betrayal ‘for any organ of African opinion to keep quiet’ chaffed under the weight of wartime regulations. These had shot up prices of newsprint from £12–15 to £30–35 per ton, and exposed the press to the ‘heavy blue pencil’ of the press censor. Consequently, editors exercised much discretion so as not to offend the regulations (Pilot 4 March 1940: Inside Stuff). Yet, the point cannot be overemphasized that especially the most critical section of the press, on the eve of the war, and persistently in the first one year of the outbreak of hostilities mobilized local support for and indeed assured the Imperial power of African loyalty.

Such mobilization of support and assurances of loyalty took concrete forms in human, monetary, and material contributions to the success of war. For instance, by 1942, Nigerians had contributed £558,000 to the Imperial Government, in addition to increased food production for export, and for local consumption. For example, railings of garri, the staple food of Southerners, from Eastern to the Northern Provinces of Nigeria increased from 6,000 to 21,000 tons in 1942, while 29,000,000 yards of cotton twine were supplied to the army for camouflage nets. In terms of men, Nigerian provinces, including Southern Cameroon supplied 181, 118 soldiers for combat engagement. Four thousand, eight hundred and forty two of these served in East Africa, 17,179 others served
in the Middle East, and 42,658 were engaged in India and Burma, while 11,700 were deployed in Cameroon. Of the number, 3,845 died in action, 1,718 were wounded, while 13 were declared missing (Mordi 1994: 146, 161). Killingray (1982: 83–7) acknowledges Nigeria’s immense contributions to the British military and labour forces in various theatres and bases of Britain’s engagement in Asia, the Middle East, East and West Africa in overwhelming numbers. Thus in spite of the shabby treatment meted out by Britain to demobilized Nigerian ex-servicemen after the First World War, which left them disgruntled, and unable to transit smoothly to civilian life (Matthews 1981: 254–71), Nigerians of the World War II era still sacrificed much in defence of Imperial Britain, and indeed of World civilization.

In the light of the foregoing, the suggestion that far removed from the war and great issues at stake, Nigerians were understandably insensitive to government’s appeals for self-sacrifice (Coleman 1958: 253) is a myth, and need no longer be taken seriously. The evidence shows that Nigerians were ready to make sacrifices for the success of war in whatever direction the colonial government required them to do so in the rational hope that after the war they would be rewarded with political freedom. Similarly, the evidence does not support the assertion that ‘at the beginning of the war, colonial officials were confronted with the task of combating widespread apathy among Africans towards the war’. Nor does it support the generalization that ‘in the lead up to the war these officials realized that they had to actively court the support of Africans for the war’ (Ibhawoh 2007: 224) What available evidence supports is that, at least in Nigeria, if not in all of British West Africa, protestations of loyalty to Britain on the outbreak of war were noticeable in many quarters (Crowder 1976: 491; 1984: 30; Williams 1984: 334), and even more importantly such protestations preceded the outbreak of war dating back to 1938.

It is also important to emphasize that the Nigerian press before the outbreak of war had identified the ultimate attainment of independence on the basis of the principle of self-determination as the expected reward of Nigerians for supporting their colonial overlords. The claim that the African elite adapted and deployed ‘war propaganda for their own anti-colonial struggles’ and ‘drew on the organizational model of colonial war propaganda for their own nationalist campaigns’ (Ibhawoh 2007: 241) is a sweeping generalization, which must be taken with a pinch of salt. On the contrary, the propaganda value of Africans’ profuse protestations of loyalty and immense concrete contributions to war effort seemed lost on Britain during the early years of the war. Colonial Nigerians were amazed at Britain’s reluctance, if not apathy or poverty of ideas in mobilizing for the sustenance of Nigerians’ good will through the use of propaganda.
3. **WARTIME PROPAGANDA AND ITS FAILURE IN NIGERIA**

Nigerian demonstration of enthusiasm for war-effort which the Nigerian press reflected seems to have fallen outside the realm of British wartime propaganda, which was inchoate in the early years of the war. In fact propaganda was so lackadaisically handled that it seemed so non-existent and left room for doubt in enlightened quarters. Ordinarily, propaganda entails some systematic effort to manipulate the beliefs, attitudes or actions of other people by means of symbols towards achieving some set goals. To this end, the propagandist deliberately presents selected facts, arguments or displays of symbols which are deliberately manipulated to divert the attention of his targets, the reactor from everything else. Such systematic manipulations to psychologically condition people to voluntarily accept restrictions or hardship as temporary or to be prepared for long term denials in war time constitute a very important strategy in military calculations and war time propaganda (Encyc. Brit. Vol 15 36–45).

Shortly before the declaration of war in 1939, a small information office was set up in the Nigerian Secretariat. It was part of the “schedule” of an Assistant Secretary, whose duty was primarily to sort and dispatch matter, which he received from the newly created Ministry of Information in London. On the outbreak of war, an Information Officer, Mr. D. C. Fletcher was appointed, and assumed the new role of distributing to the public through the press and other channels ‘authentic information on the progress of the war’. In this connection he distributed authoritative articles to the press, circulated pamphlets, written in English and Nigerian languages such as Igbo and Yoruba as well as text of important speeches from the Ministry of Information. He enlisted the support of colonial administrative officials, notably residents and district officers in the administrative provinces to keep the public informed of the course of events, and also gave broadcast talks in Lagos (Government Printer 1942: 22).

The Information Officer’s broadcasts merely complemented those of the colonial governor, whose broadcasts on the Lagos re-diffusion airwaves provided an avenue to clarify contentious issues, plead for the continued cooperation and understanding of Nigerians, state official positions, make policy statements, and seek to get Nigerians to identify more closely with his government. Yet the effects of such broadcasts were ephemeral as they soon faded into the realm of oral testimonies, subject to tendentious distortions, selective recall or deliberate amnesia or at best contentious interpretations (Stevens, Jr 1978: 25–29).

Besides, access to radio distribution service was very limited even throughout the war years, and further constricted the reach and effects of broadcasts. Loudspeakers for the reception of the broadcasts were connected in specific locations in a few major cities, namely Lagos, Ibadan, Abeokuta, Kano, Zaria, Calabar, and Port-Harcourt. The far flung rural areas of the vast country were shut out of its reach, even as only very few loudspeakers connected to the
few locations served them, making the venture economically unviable (see Table 1 below).

**Table 1.** Loudspeakers connected at the End of Each year, showing Income and Expenditure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Speakers</th>
<th>Revenue, £</th>
<th>Maintenance/ Expenditure, £</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>1940–41 2,626</td>
<td>2,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>1,218</td>
<td>1941–42 2,898</td>
<td>2,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>1,647</td>
<td>1942–43 3,643</td>
<td>3,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>2,126</td>
<td>1943–44 5,040</td>
<td>4,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>3,341</td>
<td>1944–45 7,593</td>
<td>7,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>4,234</td>
<td>1945–46 11,311</td>
<td>10,520</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The concomitant lapses in the propaganda organization and machinery enhanced the status of rumour as a source of war information. It would appear that German propaganda filled the vacuum created by the absence of a coordinated propaganda policy of the Nigerian government, and spawned demoralizing rumours of Germany’s awesome military capabilities. These shook the confidence of Nigerians in Britain’s ability to defend them against the dreaded enemy. Such was the situation in the wake of German blitzkrieg, which saw one Allied camp after another brought under the Nazi swastika in the lead up to France’s humiliating surrender and the subsequent Vichy threat in West Africa. Not only did Nigerians ‘hear denunciations of the method of their colonial rulers from German propaganda and attacks on the British by Vichy French and vice versa’, they also tended to believe that in the wake of France’s surrender, it was only a matter of time before a similar fate would befall Imperial Britain (Crowder 1976: 611).

Popular belief in the helplessness of the military situation generated palpable anxiety in Nigeria. Nigerians were alarmed about what fate would befall them ‘if the Huns come’, more so when British recruitment policy guaranteed no opportunity to the colonized for his self-defence (Pilot 22 May 1940: editorial). The publicity given in the press to the terms of colonial France’s humiliating capitulation to Germany further heightened tension and a feeling of despondency (Daily Service 15, 17, 18 June 1940: Reports; Editorials). Thus despite the defence regulations prohibition of spreading of rumours and making of demoralizing statements, panic stricken but cynical illiterate and ignorant folk openly expressed preference for German rule and their belief that Germany would overrun and occupy Nigeria within three months. The subsequent convictions of the affected persons were only evidence of a misdirected aggression (Mordi 1994: 200). Anti-British German propaganda had fuelled rumours of Hitler’s planned arrival in Lagos en route England where he had allegedly had a cup of tea (Government Printer 1943: 14–15). He was alleged to
be visiting Lagos in the wake of rumour targeted at prospective recruits ‘that the 1st Brigade had been annihilated’, that new recruits were ‘certain to be killed like those who went over first’, and ‘that the first story is the one to be believed’ since ‘all denials are just Government policy to get more men for slaughter’ (NAE 1940 Mellor to the Adjutant Enugu No 2/40). Such rumours negatively affected recruitment drives at a time when colonial Nigerian soldiers were receiving the accolades of General Officers’ Commanding (GOC’s) the Military Forces in West Africa, East Africa, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East for their courage, gallantry, efficiency, loyalty (Mordi 1994: 161), and vanguard role in restoring Emperor Haile Selassie to his throne during which they mounted a guard of honour for the GOC (Crowder 1974: 605).

The Nigerian attitude in 1940 was to regard official propaganda as non-existent, eclipsed by German propaganda, which targeted British colonial subjects The Daily Service (12 July 1940: editorial) recorded the popular assessment of what passed for propaganda thus:

…Government did not regard it as its business to maintain a fully developed Information Department which would keep an eager public supplied with all worthwhile information, and maintains [an] air of mystery about its activities…. Foreigners, among them Hitler himself, had a most healthy admiration for British propaganda in the last war. Not so in the present war. It seems other people have learnt the art so well that the British are unable to catch up… if this is true for Great Britain herself, it is worse for outposts, for Nigeria, where perhaps the peculiar circumstance calls for greater imagination.

In retrospect, Nigerians’ despondency, itself the consequence of the failure of propaganda, was justified. Killingray (1982: 85) has shown that British West African colonies were militarily weak at the time of France’s capitulation, with attendant real threat to their security by the Vichy regime. With very few and inadequate forces to repulse any such attack, the British had recourse to ‘politics and diplomacy rather than military force’. The major plank of this policy was ‘so to contain the situation as to avoid any necessity for military effort’.

British reluctance towards the deployment of anti-German propaganda was a feature of all her African colonies during the war. It resulted partly from the Colonial Office’s fear that anti-German propaganda directed at Africans ‘might lead to a revolt against white rule…’ (Kent 1992: 75). Smyth (1984: 347–52), however, attributes it to policy disagreement between the British Ministry of Information and the Colonial Office over the significance of war information and propaganda generally. The Colonial Office feared that propaganda could turn out an inconvenient boomerang more so when it sought to unfavourably contrast German rule with that of Britain, given that British subjects might correctly wonder about how much freedom they enjoyed. Nonetheless, it would appear that underlying the policy disagreements was the arrogance of the British colonial “aristocracy”, and their consequent difficulty in being seen to
condescend to justify themselves and their rule to their subjects (Crowder 1976: 492).

The effect of the hazy official propaganda policy was to deny initiative to the men on the spot, British colonial officials who consequently groped in the dark for measures to counter the effects of rumours. Secondly, in the absence of a strong institutional framework typified by an Information Office, which lacked the basic essentials to perform its duties, British propaganda was neither aggressive nor intensive. It is difficult then to see how it could be held accountable for any of Nigeria’s rising exports between 1939 and 1941 (Harneit-Sievers 1990: 38). In fact propaganda was utterly negligible, characterized by an undignified silence and aloofness, the issuance of stereotyped handouts to the press, which considered them nothing of consequence to report (Pilot 18 March 1940: Inside Stuff; Daily Service 12 July, 16 October 1940, 20 February, 13 November 1941 editorials).

It was in 1943 that the general lack of policy guidelines of previous years (NAI Oyo Prof 2/1 Vol. II) found a new official direction. The new policy was, however, not proactive, requiring as it did the Information Officer to draw the attention of editors of newspapers publishing in accurate reports or rumours to effect corrections. It, therefore, failed to deter the publication of inaccurate reports, which, by 1944 assumed the character of a campaign of deliberate misrepresentation of government policies and actions by local editors (NAI FIS 1/62 Vol. II: Circular 48/1943, WP4227/81).

The new policy changes had been gradually introduced in 1942 with the expansion of the Information Office to make it more independent, and more efficient. The objective was to reposition it as a propaganda outfit and an instrument for countering deliberate misrepresentations of government policies and actions by the Nigerian press. Towards achieving this objective, the Information Office started publishing the *Nigeria Review*, a weekly newspaper, in May 1942. It was conceived as a medium for disseminating war news, war commentaries, and for providing the public with accurate information about the activities and policies of government. The paper, which was fully funded by government, relying neither on sales nor advertisements, rose from its initial annual circulation figure of 480,000 in 1942 to 1,497,150 in 1945. It subsequently published war summaries in separate pamphlets in Igbo and Yoruba, two of Nigeria’s three major languages. In October 1942, the editorial policy of the paper was expanded to include explaining the war to Nigerians, and providing them with information, which encouraged them in their own efforts (NAI Oyo Prof I No. 3425; FIS 1/9 Inf 26/181 1942; Government Printer 1945, p.8, 1948 col. 145).

In making these changes, the colonial government of Nigeria sought to model the local Information Office on the pattern of the Ministry of Information, London. It was in this respect expected to be the only channel of communication and information about the war (NAI FIS 1/62 No. 56 Vol II: No. 44/1942). In the latter expectation, the Information Office failed woefully. Its predication of its success on cultivating friendly relations with the Nigerian press via informal
weekly chats ended in disappointment. The weekly chats lasted for only four weeks during which nobody turned up at all (NAI CSO 1/32 1943). Press conferences, which succeeded them, suffered a similar fate in spite of the governor’s presence at its Government House venue. The editors simply stopped attending because they did not want to publish matter, which would interfere with the popularity of their newspapers, and their desire to be martyred and rated as heroes of Nigeria’s independence struggle (NAI FIS 1/140 No. 103). Instead, they relied on other sources of news, including Reuters, BBC and French and American sources, or chose to remain silent in order not to offend the Defence Regulations. (Azikiwe 1994: 360).

4. THE CHALLENGE OF NATIONALISM AND THE SEARCH FOR NEW POLICY

Propaganda seems to have been hamstrung by the failure of the colonial government to meet or, at least, keep alive the expectations of the educated elite of greater administrative responsibility and involvement in the management of their own affairs as well as an end to racial discrimination, and economic exploitation. Such expectations, which preceded the war, had been sustained by colonial propagandists, who encouraged the feeling that wartime sacrifices would be rewarded at the end of hostilities. Evidence of racial discrimination in the early years of the war had elicited the warning against the dangers of dashing Nigerians’ hope that ‘their own contributions to the war effort… shall buy… for them true and lasting freedom (Daily Times 4 March 1940: editorial).

The press interpreted as racial discrimination colonial government’s military recruitment policy which up to the time of France’s humiliating surrender to Germany in June 1940 discouraged the enlistment of Nigerians to fight for Britain inspite of overwhelming evidence purveyed by the Nigerian press of Nigerians’ readiness to enlist for service. Although the policy was later modified to favour the recruitment of naive and illiterate Northern Nigerians and discourage the recruitment of educated Southern Nigerians for military service (Killingray 1982: 84–5; Crowder 1974a: 598–99), yet the charge of racial discrimination was strengthened by the official admission that Nigerian recruits earned less than their English counterparts in spite of the fact that since ‘death knows no colour’ rates of pay ought to ‘be adjusted in that spirit’ (Pilot 1 August 1941: editorial). Above all, not only did officialdom find no Nigerian soldier worthy of promotion to the officer corps, none of the numerous war-funds devoted to the comfort of troops or procurement of war equipment catered for colonial Nigerian soldiers, serving outside the shores of Nigeria.

Similarly, economic exploitation by European firms, under the aegis of the Association of West African Merchants (AWAM) assumed the pattern of racial discrimination, with a consequent backlash. Cost of living index also rose during the period when prices of imported goods soared vis-à-vis falling prices of

The Eurocentric interpretation of the Atlantic Charter by Winston Churchill completely shattered both African expectations of greater administrative responsibility and eventual political freedom (Mordi 1994: 178–81) and confidence in the British sense of honour and fair-play. Such was the level of cynicism that Governor Bourdillon’s subsequent appointment of pro-government Sir Adeyemo Alakija and Hon S. B Rhodes into his Executive Council made no impact. Instead, the Nigerian press called for ‘changes of a fundamental character not such as would give to local governors power to appoint favourites who represent nobody of local opinion to represent the country’ (Service 30 September 1942: editorial).

Indeed propaganda proved incapable of stemming the nationalist movement toward change. Not only was propaganda elite and urban-centred and focused, it failed to address local concerns. It thus lost its appeal to the generality of Nigerians, who found succour in the views articulated in the nationalist press. Propaganda material distributed through touring colonial administrative residents, district officers and other categories to schools, churches, missions, town unions, courts, and native authority council meetings failed to stimulate interest as it did not hook on to concerns of the mass of the people in the “bush”. The latter’s interest lay in increased produce prices, and increased cost of imported items, which directly affected their daily living. The unnecessarily lengthy articles of the Nigeria Review bored its few readers who had difficulties with place names, technical terms, and war related jargons. The Review also took for granted the idleness and enthusiasm of the people for war news by expecting them to assemble in the official residence of the designated officer to have material read or interpreted to them. Such methods were not expected to yield positive results until at least another generation (NAI FIS 1/62 Inf 56/307, Oyo Prof 2/3 File No. C227 Vol. V: 1942–43).

Official propaganda grappled with an even greater challenge. The struggle for the political succession of the colonial masters had taken a definite shape. Nigeria’s editor-nationalists sought to shift the battleground to London. The nationalist press, led by the West African Pilot (14 September 1942 editorial) had asked that West African editors be invited like their counterparts from other parts of the colonial Empire to the United Kingdom for valuable contacts, and a first hand appreciation of efforts connected with the war. The Colonial Office in London had approved of such a visit because it believed in the potential of the visit to bolster African confidence in the tenacity of British determination to fight until victory was achieved, and thus weaken the effects of enemy propaganda on Nigerians, in addition to impressing the Americans of Britain’s “liberal” colonial policy (Azikiwe 1994: 357–58).

The West African Press delegation of May 1943 provided Azikiwe with an opportunity to present his political blueprint of Nigeria in which he demanded the independence of British West African Colonies over a fifteen-year period.
beginning from 1943, or after the end of hostilities. The West African Students’ Union (W.A.S.U.) in Britain had adopted the time limit set by the blueprint and impressed it on the Secretary of State for the Colonies as representative of the exact and true wishes and aspirations of the people of West Africa. In a similar vein, Reginald Sorensen, Labour Member of the British Parliament tabled the memorandum before the British public, and specifically called on the British government to indicate a time limit of ten to 15 years, within which British West Africa would become independent (Azikiwe 1957: 12–14).

Mr. Sorensen further impressed on Azikiwe the need for a common front in Nigeria through which Nigerians could effectively present a common ground on their demands. He also advised Azikiwe to go into nationalist politics, seek election into the colonial legislature as a platform to get his questions, even if overruled, chronicled in the debates of the legislature, and be taken up in the British Parliament. Azikiwe’s implementation of these suggestions on his return to Africa culminated in the formation of the nationalist, nation-wide National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) in 1944 (Mordi 1994: 181–86).

The challenge of Azikiwe’s scheme of transfer of power was formidable and taken seriously by Nigerian officialdom. The latter sought any effective means of nipping in the bud the spread and acceptance of the scheme for ‘the early realization’ of ‘early full self-government in dependencies such as Nigeria’. It was feared that ‘if the patent impossibility and advisability of such schemes are not… gently but firmly’ articulated and publicized, Nigerians could build up’ hopes which ‘will create discontent in the near future if not realized’ (NAI Oyo Prof 2/3 No. C227 Vol. V, 30 November 1943).

In a bid to tackle this formidable challenge, the colonial government attempted to beef up its propaganda machinery at the end of 1943. The Information Office changed its name to the Public Relations Office on 1 January 1944. The change was intended to signify a new departure, and new policy. Unlike the Information Office, the Public Relations Office manned by D. C. Fletcher, former Information Officer was assigned the task of presenting a ‘picture of Nigeria to the outside world’ as well as assisting ‘the Government in all activities requiring propaganda’. Government placed much hope for the achievement of this objective on the Nigeria Review. This hope was dashed, however, as Africans regarded what they read in the Nigeria Review as ‘pure propaganda’ a lot of which was untrue. For instance, they could not reconcile the stories of continued military successes of the Allies with the continued demand for recruits. They, therefore, tended to believe more of what they read in the local newspapers, which sooner came to be needed to encourage local patronage of the Nigeria Review. The Resident Benin Province in fact recommended in 1944 that copies of the Nigeria Review being forwarded to his Province would be accompanied with war supplements, which should be issued free with every copy of the Pilot, Spokesman, and other publications of the Zik Group because ‘these rags have the “circulation” and their readers have implicit faith in the truth of all they publish’ (NAI FIS 1/9 No. 14 vol. II June Quarter 1944).
The *Nigeria Review* lacked the wherewithal to meet the goals set for it. Without the profit motive, a printing press, full compliment of staff operating outside the civil service structure, poorly produced, and ‘completely lacking in popular appeal’, the *Review* could not offer the quality, number, and size demanded by its assignment. The colonial administration had devised ingenious means of disseminating the news published by the newspaper. Reading rooms had been organized in towns and villages across Nigeria where teachers, court clerks, sanitary inspectors, dispensers, in fact anybody who could read were assembled to read the usually few copies available. They digested all information and news of local interest and relayed these to their illiterate compatriots, who were invited to the compounds of village heads or other, designated authorities ‘to listen to the news’. Thus direct contact with the colonial administrative officers became the most important source of information for the ordinary rural folk. Consequently, the *Review* proved an abysmal failure. It was completely helpless, and ineffective in countering ‘outrageous misstatements’ deliberately published in the Nigerian press, which the latter subsequently corrected with ‘tepid Press Notices’ (Government Printer 1946: 219–20; NAI FIS 1/9 No. 14 Vol. II June Quarter 1944; Oyo Prof 2/3 File No. C227 Vol. V 4th April 1944; Oyo Prof 2/3 C151: 29th August 1945).

The Public Relations Office fared no better. In the absence of mass education, the expectation that it could effectively dispel ignorance about government policies and intentions was clearly misplaced. Nor was it equipped to counter the activities and propaganda of the nationalist press (NAI Oyo Prof 2/3 C151 20 August 1945), which were aimed at eroding confidence in the colonial state, and diverting Nigerians’ loyalty to the emergent self-governing polity advocated by Azikiwe (Aloba 1959: 317–21; Enahoro 1965: 79–82). In fact faced with the virulent anti-colonial propaganda of the nationalist press, the Public Relations Office adopted an almost entirely defensive posture. It could muster neither the will power nor the resources to explain in ‘simple terms reasons for and purposes of government’ actions (NAI FIS 1/9 No. 14 Vol. II March 1945; Oyo Prof 2/3 3151 23 October 1945) during the famous General Strike of 1945 (Oyemakinde 1975: 693–710). Towards the end of the Second World War, war induced hardships and failure of the colonial government to abide by its 1942 promise to approve wage review to reflect the cost of living index had resulted to a general strike by African Civil Servants Technical Workers’ Union, which lasted for 44 days beginning from 21 June 1945. The colonial government accused Azikiwe of instigating the strike, and banned the publication of the *West African Pilot* and the *Daily Comet*, leading lights of the Zik Group of Newspapers for three months. The banned newspapers had been accused of instigating workers against the government which visited a lot of punitive actions with deleterious effects on the Zik Group (Azikiwe 1994: 368–83; West Africa 22 September 1945: 907–9). While the official propaganda outfit stuck to the crafting and circulation of strictly confidential memos meant to be tucked away in files, Azikiwe masterfully capitalized upon the strike to launch himself into national and international reckoning as the undisputed leader.
of Nigeria’s post-war nationalist movement, who was martyred for seeking to advance Nigeria’s political freedom (Enahoro 1965: 79–81; Coleman 1958: 259).

Indeed as the Second World War came to an end, the colonial state of Nigeria assessed its wartime propaganda. Its verdict was that its effects were ‘practically nil’ because of the profound apathy to war-news and talks as well as ignorance about the war and wartime propaganda by the educated elements on whom so many propaganda leaflets and copies of the *Nigeria Review* were expended. Propaganda talks organized by the colonial administrative echelon were boycotted by all except curiosity-seeking ‘young school children who could not “hear” English’ (NAI FIS 1/9 No. 14 Vol. II July 1944). The School Leaving Certificate Examination for standard VI pupils in schools in which propaganda literature was regularly distributed in the Benin Province revealed profound evidence of the failure of wartime propaganda (see Table 2 below).

**Table 2. Answers to General Knowledge Paper in Benin Province’s Standard VI Examinations 1944.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Answers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Relations Office</td>
<td>Is Mr. Azikiwe. He publishes <em>Pilot, Review, and Spokesman.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>»</td>
<td>Is the Minister of Food.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>»</td>
<td>Is where they make up the news and send it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>»</td>
<td>Is where <em>Pilot</em> paper comes from.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>»</td>
<td>Is where Postmaster is living.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propaganda</td>
<td>Is all lies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>»</td>
<td>Is any news in newspaper.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>»</td>
<td>Those who preach false religion like Jehovah Witnesses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>»</td>
<td>Art of telling lies well.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>»</td>
<td>Food for soldiers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. O. L. A</td>
<td>The name of the first bomb to fall on England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Markets</td>
<td>Where two or more Nigerians have to fight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fascists</td>
<td>An invention of the British Army.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Clearly wartime propaganda was ineffective in sustaining Nigerians’ interests in war efforts, and in the acceptance of the colonial state as a framework for the attainment of their lasting social welfare and political development. Azikiwe and his newspapers had captured the popular imagination by hooking on to current concerns, and yearnings of Nigerians, and in packaging messages and news that were both familiar, reassuring and did not threaten them psychologically. Thus this study upholds the view that in most cases reactors tend to ‘pay the most attention to the publications, shows, leaders, and role models with whose views they already agree’ (Encycl. Brit: 42). Official propaganda could not show what material and immediate benefits would accrue to its targets by the actions which it advocated. Its failure, therefore, had nothing to do with ‘harmful and ignorant’
or ‘prejudiced articles’ published in the nationalist press (NAI FIS 1/9 File No. 14 Vol. II March 1945). Nigeria in 1945 was characterized by spiralling inflation, soaring cost of living, the excesses of a colonial autocracy which was determined to roll back the tide of change and stifle local desire for advance to self-government vis-à-vis the stirrings of a nationalist movement which was riding the crest of popular acclaim, and a partisan press articulating and disseminating the message of change towards freedom and life more abundant. These factors coupled with the defeats which Britain suffered in the Far East had exploded the myth of the invincibility of Imperial Britain and made wartime propaganda to face an uphill task in seeking to win Nigerians’ loyalty to an Empire on which the sun shall never set.

Given this hard reality, the colonial government in 1945 considered a new propaganda policy. The policy sought to abandon the earlier entirely defensive slant of its propaganda in favour of an aggressive, ‘no-bones-about it policy’ through the instrumentality of a repositioned Nigeria Review to ‘counteract subversive propaganda’. The Public Relations Officer was, under the new policy expected to assume a more prominent role as the chief propaganda officer of the colonial administration, working in liaison with the Nigerian Secretariat to disseminate “good propaganda” (NAI Oyo Prof 2/3 C151 23 October 1945, 21 March 1946) in the post war period, which is outside the purview of this study.

5. CONCLUSION

Wartime propaganda during the Second World War in Nigeria was belated, haphazard, reluctant, and failed to shape Nigerians’ perception of their political destiny. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Nigerians fully supported Britain in her decision to go to war with Germany, and greeted the declaration of war with uncommon protestations of loyalty, which in the war years translated to massive contributions in self-sacrifice of men, material and money. Nigerians, egged on by rational hopes of equitable returns in the form of political freedom after the war, resented official acts of racial discrimination and deviousness during the war, which discredited official propaganda and cast a slur on the British sense of honour, justice and fair-play. At the end of the war, the colonial state admitted that the impact of its war propaganda was practically nil, eclipsed by a surging nationalism purveyed by the nationalist press, whose ‘subversive propaganda’ the state frantically sought ways of countering in the post-war period.
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